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The
Press and the Peruvian Crisis
How
much did the press contribute to the disclosure of the transgressions
of the Fujimori-Montesinos regime in Peru? A look at the history
of the last few years shows that many of the things that surprise
us now had been reported earlier.
By Ricardo Uceda
Since
1992, the year when he assumed dictatorial powers by closing
Congress, the main fight of Alberto Fujimori was not against
the opposition, which never mustered a popular majority to
defeat him. It was against the independent press, a small
group of news media and journalists that was able to reveal
part of the repulsiveness of the regime and contributed to
change the spirit of the government.
The news media
were ferociously attacked by the National Intelligence Service
(SIN), directed by Vladimiro Montesinos, but to no avail:
the most unpopular moments for Fujimori didn't originate in
public protests or strikes or parliamentary defeats. They
were journalistic investigations. Just news, plain and simple.
The
crisis that brought about Fujimori’s resignation, however,
did not come as a result of investigative journalism. What
triggered it was the famous video in which Montesinos is seen
bribing a congressman. The public knew that Fujimori had corrupted
congressmen - the independent press had reported it - but
nobody had seen it; the devastating image convinced everyone
not only that the previous accusations were true but that
there was probably much more. And now that Fujimori and Montesinos
are off the stage, the judicial system, free from pressure,
is looking into press reports that had previously been ignored.
The first, in 1993,
was by the news magazine Sí, which showed that nine
students and a professor from the Cantuta University were
assassinated by the Colina Group, a military squad protected
by the government. Although the Army rolled the tanks out,
Fujimori -who had by then become "democratized,"
having had a congress elected- could not prevent the start
of trials of the military elements involved. Channel 2 produced
the second big report when it revealed that the Army had tortured
one of its own intelligence agents, Leonor La Rosa. Later,
the newspaper Liberación showed the existence of Montesinos'
multi-million dollar income, evidently illicit. And then came
the investigation of El Comercio and Channel N that proved
that Fujimori’s inscription as a candidate in the 2000
elections contained more than a million falsified signatures.
In
all these cases, the government was able to trample the justice
system, allowing the corruption to continue. To save members
of the Colina Group, an unconstitutional law was passed allowing
them a military trial; subsequently they were granted amnesty.
Nor was there any punishment in the Army for those involved
in torture. The income of Montesinos was never investigated.
The justice sector preferred to prosecute those who had denounced
the falsified signatures.
Nor did the authorities
investigate the charges of fraud in the May elections. Indeed,
after the third reelection, the press showed that the denunciation
of an arms deal with Colombian guerrillas, originally made
by Fujimori and Montesinos themselves, was in reality a cover-up
of parties who were linked to them. Once again, the judicial
system ignored the evidence.
When
Fujimori, before his resignation, found himself obliged to
investigate Montesinos, the first thing the attorney general's
office did was ask the investigative reporters for copies
of their stories. Two weeks later the attorney general's office
made public a work plan based on evidence of four crimes presumably
committed by Montesinos: drug trafficking, extortion, financial
fraud and bribery. The majority of these charges originated
in press reports.
Obviously the investigation
of Montesinos by journalists has a long ways to go; it's probably
only half completed. But if a comparison were made between
what was published about him and what was happening at the
time within the government agencies which should have been
in charge of prosecuting his crimes, it would become apparent
that on at least 12 occasions the judicial sector condoned
the very activities that the press documented or to which
the press made specific reference.
The
list starts in 1975 with the first accusation against Montesinos,
while he was still on active duty in the military. Instead
of being tried for what he was - a spy for the United States
- he was given a slap on the wrist for disobedience. To investigate
further would have implicated the negligence of his boss,
a prominent general from whom he stole secret documents. Nor
was Montesinos investigated for taking files from the Public
Ministry, where he operated freely in the 1980s.
It was for this
very reason that Fujimori sought him out when he was a presidential
candidate in 1990. Fujimori had a thorny problem involving
tax evasion, and Montesinos, after calming him down, disappeared
only to return with a package under his arm. It was Fujimori's
file.
That's
how the relationship between these two men began, who now,
under different circumstances, will again be the target of
press investigations. This time, apparently, in the company
of the recently-liberated judicial system.
Ricardo Uceda heads the investigative reporting team for
El Comercio, Lima
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